

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF SECULARIZATION

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Abstract: *The paper proposes a counter-secularization hypothesis based on a holistic approach to the world, as suggested by contemporary physics. Such a representation defuses the negative correlation between intelligence and religiosity. Thus, the paper highlights the main dimensions of contemporary religiosity, as well as those of the relation between religiosity and secularisation. Moreover, it critically approaches the counter-secularization hypothesis that is anchored in the genetic determination of intelligence, religiosity and fertility.*

Key words: *secularization, religiosity, quantum physics.*

1. Introduction

Specialists differ on secularization and its future. This paper is based on the holistic approach suggested by the discoveries in physics made during the past century and aims at formulating a counter-secularization hypothesis. The first part outlines the main theoretical approaches to religiosity. The second part critically presents a counter-secularization hypothesis based on the correlations between intelligence, religiosity and fertility as highlighted by specialized literature. In the end, it presents arguments in favour of an alternate counter-secularization hypothesis.

2. Features of Contemporary Westerners' Religiosity

The recent research on the Westerners' religion and religiosity predominantly approaches the topics of secularization, privatization of faith and spirituality. The borders of these topics are not strictly established. For instance, the privatization of faith can be considered a part of the secularization process, as well as an argument for contesting secularization. The revitalization of pre-Christian religions sabotages Christianity, yet it maintains the Westerners' religiosity. Spirituality may be considered both a genre and an alternative to the official religion.

The paper presents a few theoretical positions considered to be relevant for the current stage in the research of these topics and their interpenetrations.

2.1. Defining Dimensions of the Secularization

On the Weberian original line, the term is used in the socio-humanistic papers with three

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main meanings: secularization is the loss by the religious instances of their control on social life; then, secularization is the replacement of the human groups' religious organization with a profane organization; secularization is, finally, the general reduction of society's religious character. The meanings of secularization are considered separately or conjunctly. A Romanian dictionary of sociology defines secularization as "a process especially characteristic of modern times, which consists in a tendency to diminish the role of religion in social life" (Zamfir and Vlăsceanu, 1993, p.535).

Dobbeleare (2011), analyzing the secularization as a process of functional degradation and status degradation of the religious systems, which come to be considered of the same rank with the subsystems they previously dominated, outlines two main dimensions of this process: the loss of social by religion, and the diminution of the individuals' piety. The process of secularization primarily affects the Western cultural area. Defining secularization as loss, diminution, reduction does not necessarily assign it depreciative intentions. They were neither present at Weber, nor presented in the usual bibliography of the theme. The two dimensions of secularization highlighted by Dobbeleare (2011) enhance each other in a familiar and desirable direction for the Westerners (the individualization of religion fosters the change of the political perspective on the Christian foundations of Western legislation; the change of political perspective weakens the social power of religion and increases thereby the individual's religious freedom).

Furthermore, Zuckerman (2014) highlights the positive dimensions of secularization which are supported by the highly-performing education systems, the development of technology and the informational access to knowledge: the respect for women's rights and for the rights of sexual minorities, the stimulation of children's independence in thinking, the expansion of the horizons of knowledge, which is also common in elderly people (Bódi, 2012).

2.2. Causes of the Secularization

From Weber onwards, various opinions on the causes of secularization have been formulated. Western rationalism and liberalism has fostered imposing an atheistic perspective over the world, as well as considering religion as a barrier to humanity's progress. The evolution of the West towards the loss of faith is logically justified in the context and predictable, as shown by J. Turner (apud Bainbridge, 2011). Mainly because religion can be severely reproached: in its name, wars are initiated and massacres perpetrated; its followers are exploited; the viewpoints it promotes are unrealistic, Bainbridge (2011) further adds.

On the other hand, Dobbeleare (2011) believes that secularization is not the outcome of an explicitly anti-religious attitude, but of society's social differentiation. Dutton and Van der Linden (2017) appreciate, in evolutionary terms, that intelligence, involved in rational problem solving, and involving, in its turn, intellectual curiosity, is an over-fulfilment of religion, which is instinctual. Neuhaus (1986) considers secularization as an implication of postmodernism, part of a greater rebellion against any cultural standardization. The causal anchorage /non-anchorage of secularization in an anti-religious attitude influences the way in which the future of secularization is theoretically prefigured.

2.3. Secularization Enhances Spirituality

Stark, Hamberg and Miller (apud Hamberg, 2011) define spirituality as a sum of beliefs, feelings and practices, which suppose the existence of the supernatural, and the acquisition of benefits on its behalf, without their being necessarily associated to an organized religious structure. Hamberg (2011) emphasizes two operational meanings for the term “spirituality”: the former within the church, in which case the term refers to a higher form of piety, and the latter outside the church, as an alternative form of religiosity. The latter is more widely used in sociology and anthropology papers. In this paper, the former meaning will be placed in brackets, and the term “spirituality” will be used with the latter meaning, too.

Dobbeleare (2011) deems secularization compatible with spirituality. Other papers emphasize a positive correlation between secularization and increased spirituality: Roberts (1998) and Lyon (2000) highlight the fundamentalist revival of fundamentalist subcultures; on the other hand, Wenzel (2011) points to the emergence of new, non-institutionalized and unstructured spiritual expressions.

Stark, Hamberg and Miller (apud Hamberg, 2011) highlight the similarity between spirituality and ancient popular religions. Their definition of spirituality supports this similarity: with the supernatural perceived as divine, and with a dismantled religious structure, popular religions can be treated as a form of spirituality.

In fact, contemporary Europe marks a recrudescence of paganism (Sorea, 2013, 2015b). Europeans’ appetite for indigenous, pre-Christian religions is considered a protest response to the diminution in importance of the national state within the common European policy of our days (Lindquist, 1997), a reaction to the anxieties associated by Bauman (2000) to the “liquid modernity” and a confirmation of the relation emphasized by Durkheim between religion and allegiance (Rountree, 2014). The viability of Durkheim’s theory on the relation between religion and collective life is also referred to by Smith (2017), who shows that around some secular beliefs, congregations may be formed, whose members interact according to the religious model.

2.4. Secularization Does Not Imply the Disappearance of Religion

In Dobbeleare’s vision (2011), secularization is compatible with spirituality, and also with religious bricolage, with the religion “à la carte” and with the privatization of faith. However, in the equation of contemporary religiosity, with the secularization in the background, the believer’s comfort is important: the God with Whom the individual accepts to enter into a personal relationship is necessarily friendly (Nolen, 1999), dogmatic impositions are selectively assumed, the consumption of religion takes the place of religious commitment (Bibby, 1987).

The assumed independence from canonical Christian religiosity is a fact even in Poland, as emphasized by Skrzypińska (2016): Poland has shown, after the death of Pope John Paul II, a tendency towards the privatization of faith, placing themselves thereby in the common European trend.

De Waal (2014) believes that Europeans are not anti-Christian; they only want to minimize, without sectioning, nevertheless, the relation with the church: the birth, marriage and death are the only moments in which the connection is activated and,

thereof, the first and the last are not directly managed by the individuals. In addition, Gotea (2014) considers the celebration of marriage, birth, baptism, or organizing other religious rituals to be significantly influenced by the economic factor: in nowadays Romanian society, limited financial resources have led to the reduction of collective participation in events related to these fundamental moments of family life.

Secularization does not affect the vicarial dimension of religion, contemporary Westerners resort to their capital of traditional religious sensitivities and beliefs at turning moments, as shown by (Davie, 2002). “Belonging without believing” discussed by Repstad (1996) is, in this context, a comfortable religious option.

On the other hand, the theme of the implicit religious dimension of the great ideologies of modernity dates earlier. Marxism is similar to religion, it is a sect or a Judeo-Christian heresy, as believed by N. Berdiaev (apud Codoban, 1996), its sources are mythological, Judaic-prophetic, and the proposed solutions are Judeo-Christian. The human proclaimed as “supreme being for the human” marks the creature’s pride to be the Creator, the heretical desire of man to be God. The sacralization of social relations is the shameful secret hidden at the core of communist totalitarianism. Benjamin (1996) and Weidner (2010, apud Nikiforova, 2017) consider Capitalism as a religious cult consecrated to the power which takes the form of capital.

2.5. Anti-Christian Component of Secularization

Without implying the disappearance of religion, the secularization process has, nevertheless, an implicit anti-Christian component. It is a process which mainly affects the Western States, in the history of which Christianity is a defining, essential factor, and in which Christianity is still the religion with most adepts. Contemporary Westerners’ religiosity departs from Christianity, turning towards a variant of spirituality centred on the private relationship with an impersonal divinity or cosmic power, as highlighted by Milacci, too (2006, apud Yu et al., 2017).

Currently Europe is post-Christian, as claimed by Yu et al. (2017). For Wenzel (2011) and Eberstadt (2013), contemporary Europe is downright Christo-phobic. The secularization process has been from the beginning emphasized /researched in relation with the Western, traditionally Christian, cultural area. Its consideration as a global process is appreciated by some researchers as an illegitimate extrapolation. Dueck et al. (2017) show that the research of religion is tributary to the Western perspective on the world, that is, it brings along, as a background, capitalism, industrialization, individualism, pluralism. Against this Western, not universal background, the theme of secularization is inserted. Given that 86% of the world’s population confesses its affiliation to a form of religion, ignoring the religious dimension in defining culture is the expression of a Western ideological approach - biased (Dueck et al., 2017). Nikiforova (2017) points out, in her turn, the liberal and pragmatic European background of secularization, highlighting apart from this that it is not the only variant of evolution not even in Europe, and even less so elsewhere in the world.

2.6. Future of Secularization

Regarding the future of the secularization process, opinions are divided, too. Norris and Inglehart (2012) emphasize the decrease of religiosity with the transition from the

agrarian societies to the industrial and post-industrial ones, as an argument for the continuation of the secularization process in Europe in the coming years. The previously mentioned authors believe that the financial and social security diminishes the need for anchoring in the supernatural and bring as an argument the example of the countries from the former USSR and Eastern Europe, in which there was a two-decade long increase in religiosity, followed by a return to atheism. On the contrary, Yu et al. (2017) consider the thesis of the existence of a strong direct correlation between secularization and social welfare as simplistic and Western-specific.

On the other hand, Hamberg (2011) highlights the importance of specifying the connotations of the terms used for asserting Europe's secularization, and brings to the fore again the semantic relations between religion, religiosity and spirituality: if the secularization is the decline of Christian religiosity, European countries are in a process of secularization; if secularization is the decline of any form of religiosity (in which case the religion, as a system of beliefs and practices associated to the supernatural, connotatively approaches spirituality - n.n.), Europe's secularization is no longer obvious, inasmuch as the decreased importance of organized, official religion, favours and is countered by the flourishing of spiritual movements outside the church.

Dobbeleare (2011) believes that the secularization process is reversible, bringing as an argument the revaluation of religion in Russia and ex-communist countries, as a part of redefining their citizens' identity. The concept of identity is extremely comprehensive, it refers to the individual identity (or subjective), the social identity (or collective), cultural identity, gender identity, sexual identity, the religious identity, racial identity, ethnic identity, national identity, as Bolborici (2016) shows. Lambert (2003) considers that the rhythm of secularization has decreased in recent years and that, especially in young people, along with the development of a religiosity without affiliation (believing without belonging), there is a revival of Christianity. Hamberg (2011) in his turn, considers that young people's current position to religion and religiosity (to wit the decline of the options "à la carte", of the uncertainty and relativism among them) is a de-secularization indicator. Such findings justify the appreciation of the current epoch, on Jürgen Habermas' line, as post-secular (Nikiforova, 2017; Pfister, 2017).

Secularization will mark a decline in the 21st century, as believed by Ellis et al. (2017), in their turn, despite the slight rise in religiosity in Europe over the past 15 years. Their arguments, which are of a different nature, will be presented and discussed below (chapters 3-4).

2.7. Flexible Post-Secular Border between the Sacred and the Profane

Nikiforova (2017) highlights the flexibilization of the border between the sacred and the profane, in a post-secular context, considering it a reflection of the pragmatic tendencies prevailing worldwide. The sacred becomes secular in various ways, as pointed out by Nikiforova: religious tourism is a widespread form of cultural entertainment, several churches and museums turn into concert halls, religious relics enter private collections; but the profane can become sacred, too. The two processes run in parallel: in contemporary society, the sacred is secularized, and the secular is sacralised. Nikiforova reports, in this context, the commercialization of the sacred and the sacralization of the market, the consumption as "a vehicle for achieving transcendent, spiritual, emotional, and psycho-therapeutic experience" (2017, p. 9).

Pfister (2017) in his turn, signals the post-secular mixing of attitudes and places: religious attitudes manifested in secular spaces, profane attitudes manifested in sacred places (in one's own culture or in the cultures of others).

2.8. Post-Secular Recovery of Christian Love

The public policies of recent years revolve around concepts such as assistance, charity, community development, mutual help, and cohesion. The origin of these concepts in Christianity was highlighted and argumentatively used in various post-secular approaches to the recovery of the saving potential of love.

Rorty (Rorty and Vattimo, 2008) recognizes the historical and necessary role of Christianity in imposing democracy in the West, democracy which he reckons as the only political modality of taking over the Christian message about love as law, prefiguring in Messianic terms a global civilization governed by love.

Vattimo (Rorty and Vattimo, 2008) reckons secularization as the fulfilment of Christianity's vocation, the continuation of *kénosis*, God's Self-giving, Who, after descending to man's condition, allows atheism for salvation purposes, with a view to ensuring humankind's survival by charity, in a community of assumed love.

Girard (Girard and Vattimo, 2009) believes that mimetic violence is constitutive to the human, and that the Gospels acted in time over the Westerners, helping them understand and assume their own violence. However, comprehension and assumption are not sufficient to ensure the survival of the species under the incontrollable unleashing of violence. Only the full assumption of Christ's love can do it, as believed by Girard.

All these thinkers allow themselves great freedom from the Christian dogma (Sorea, 2009, 2015b), but they recover from the point of view of value love, which is the core of Christianity. Democracy, charity, responsibility are the valid contemporary forms, of religious origin, of the love for others. On their support, the world's comfortable future can be configured, Rorty, Vattimo and Girard consider.

Raţulea (2015) highlights international cooperation and care for the next generation as extensions of distributive justice that ecological justice implies. Popescu (2015) believes that retrieving Christian values into the "capillarity" of social relations (as superficial options of Christians) represents the chance of a happy alternative to violence and consumerism. Both these theoretical positions have in the background the same idea of humankind's survival in a community of assumed love.

3. A Counter-Secularization Hypothesis Anchored in the Correlation between Intelligence, Religiosity and Fertility

Ellis et al. (2017) also argue in favour of a decline in secularization, even though they do it in a somewhat more daring manner. They proceed by presenting the results of a research endeavour based on a questionnaire concerning the direct correlation between Malaysian and US students' religiosity and their parents' fertility. Then, the authors indicate the convergence of their results with those of other research projects focused on the genetic foundation for religiosity, fertility and intelligence, on the one hand, and on the correlations among these variables, on the other hand. Furthermore, assuming a positive correlation between religiosity and fertility and a negative correlation between intelligence and any of the aforementioned variables, Ellis et al. propose a counter-

secularization hypothesis according to which a decrease in intelligence and an increase in religiosity are genetically supported by fertility.

Ellis et al. (2017) signal a reverse in the IQ evolution trend in the West - that is a slight reduction in IQ average, as the latest research in the field shows. They attribute it to the following: Western environmental factors (such as good nutrition, medical insurance, efficient educational practices, and parents' attention divided among a lower number of children) which favour an increase in IQ have already reached their maximum contribution and leave room from now on to the determining role of genetic factors.

According to Zuckerman et al. (2013), quoted by Ellis et al (2017), intelligent people tend to be less religious. Ellis et al. (2017) associate intelligence to the capacity to think in a secular manner, namely to use scientific knowledge for the complete configuration (with no resort to the supernatural whatsoever) of a *Weltanschauung*. The previously mentioned authors acknowledge that individuals' level of education is relevant for their intelligence level. It is based on this understanding of intelligence that the authors manage the reverse correlation between intelligence and religiosity.

A lower IQ average means fewer intelligent people, and hence, by correlation, higher chances for group religiosity to increase. In the next generation the effects of that will amplify given the different reproduction rates of intelligent/religious people, as Ellis et al. (2017) remind. Highly educated families have few children. A feature associated to a high reproduction rate is automatically selected. Religiosity is selected to the detriment of non-religiosity. As Johnson (2012, apud Ellis et al., 2017) shows, from an evolutionary perspective atheism will be eliminated since religious groups reproduce faster than the atheists. The change in the ratio of non-religious/secular/intelligent people and religious individuals is not only the result of the low reproduction rate of educated Western families. Another cause contributing this transformation is the influx of people from highly religious areas into the West.

When the intelligence of the fertile decreases and their religiosity increases, secularization regresses. Ellis et al. (2017) subsume several predictions to their counter-secularization hypothesis and these are based on the results of their research on the correlation between ascendants' religiosity and their fertility. Thus, according to them, there is a positive correlation between the two variables (religiosity and fertility) in the case of all religions on which their research focused. Moreover, the authors show that the Muslims are the highest religious group while also recording the highest reproduction rate from among the religious groups they studied (which, according to the aforementioned authors, explains the high percentage of Islamic fundamentalists).

Continuing with the predictions they subsume to the counter-secularization hypothesis, Ellis et al. (2017) believe that in the twenty-first century intelligence will gradually decline while world's religiosity will increase with the Islam expanding compared to other religions. A decline in IQ is to be observed, especially in countries that currently record high IQ levels and low religiosity levels, namely industrialized nations.

A decline in IQ is not equated to a blockage in the growth of scientific knowledge. The counter-secularization process unfolds simultaneously with the progress of science and provides information on world's make-up. However, as Ellis et al. (2017) show, the percentage of individuals able to understand, and rationally believe and validate scientific knowledge is decreasing on overall. That is the reason why the various

theories on secularization that directly correlate the progress of scientific knowledge to abandoning religious beliefs in favour of some secular *Weltanschauung* do not manage to capture the real size of such a process.

The number of secular thinkers will decrease while religiosity will increase. The logical, analytical (and hence not resorting to the supernatural) thinking that supports secularization requires intelligence and is facilitated by a low level of religiosity. Genetically, these features are less and less supported: “By the end of the twenty-first century, we predict that nearly all of the countries with the highest proportions of secularism will become much more religious in proportional terms and observably lower in average intelligence.”, as Ellis et al. (2017, p.11) indicate.

The authors place the Muslims, as a religious group with the highest level of religiosity and reproduction rate, in the middle of the counter-secularization process. “Instead, over the long term, we predict that the most religious «shall inherit the earth», so to speak. This is especially so for the most fertile religious groups—Islam.”, point out Ellis et al. (2017, p.9). They suggest several direct effects of the increase in the number of Muslims in Europe on the European educational system: “As Muslim representation in Europe and elsewhere continues to grow, we would not be surprised to see pressure to mount on educational institutions to avoid hiring professors or even offering courses with content that are insensitive to Islamic values.” (Ellis et al., 2017, p.14) They also reiterate the conclusions of a 2006 study on the presence of Muslims in Europe: the old continent’s de-Christianization is not the result of scientific humanism but the consequence of Islam spread (Jenkins, 2006, apud Ellis et al. 2017).

4. The Limits of a Counter-Secularization Hypothesis Anchored in the Correlation between Intelligence, Religiosity and Fertility

The counter-secularization hypothesis proposed by Ellis et al. (2017) is supported by a correct reasoning, logically speaking. Based on the premises outlined by Ellis et al. (2017): Religiosity is substantially heritable/ Fertility is substantially heritable/ Religiosity and fertility are positively correlated/ Intelligence is substantially heritable/ Intelligence is inversely correlated with religiosity/ Intelligence and fertility are inversely correlated (p. 10), and considering genetic determination as an implicit attribute of any of the three variables (religiosity, fertility, intelligence) the reasoning advanced by Ellis et al. (2017) is expressed as follows:

$$[(iWf) \& (iWr) \& (i \leftrightarrow f)] \rightarrow [\neg i \rightarrow (r \& f)]$$

Statements i, r and f have the following content:

- i: Intelligence (substantially heritable) increases.
- r: Religiosity (substantially heritable) increases.
- f: Fertility (substantially heritable) increases.

To simplify the decision on the truth value of the statements, we equalled the reverse process of secularization (that pertains to the counter-secularization hypothesis) with the conjunction between the increase in religiosity and the increase in fertility (r&f) . The statement is a tautology. In this context, the conclusion of the reasoning can be

challenged only from the perspective of the premises. The conclusion of the reasoning runs counter to the already secular ideals in Europe (that is ideals that are as old as centuries) and is unsettling. Hence, the critical approach of the endeavour that generated it is natural and justified.

The premise that is easiest to challenge is the one referring to the negative correlation between intelligence and religiosity. Ellis et al. (2017) formulate it starting from the conclusions of Zuckerman et al. (2013). Nonetheless, the meanings of the terms “intelligence” and “religiosity” as employed by Zuckerman et al. do not entirely cover the entire semantics of the terms

Concerning the intelligence subject, the research conducted by Zuckerman et al. (2013) and which underlies the reasoning of Ellis et al. (2017) explicitly refers to analytical intelligence. Neither emotional intelligence, nor the creative one is taken into consideration when establishing the reverse correlation between religiosity and intelligence.

Zuckerman et al. suggest the strict meaning for which this correlation is relevant: “Three possible interpretations were discussed. First, intelligent people are less likely to conform and, thus, are more likely to resist religious dogma. Second, intelligent people tend to adopt an analytic (as opposed to intuitive) thinking style, which has been shown to undermine religious beliefs. Third, several functions of religiosity, including compensatory control, self-regulation, self-enhancement, and secure attachment, are also conferred by intelligence. Intelligent people may therefore have less need for religious beliefs and practices.” (2017, p. 325).

Analytical intelligence is a human feature developed and based on operational rationality and favoured by the path taken by Western culture after the Reform and as a reaction to that (Culianu, 1994). It is the feature that supports what the Western civilization currently calls scientific knowledge, which is the result of operating with scientific methods. Ioan Petru Culianu (1994) relates this type of knowledge, which is very close and tributary to empirical experience, to the amputation of human imagination under the terror of Church hunting witches.

When taking such a view, knowledge becomes the result of human endeavour. The process of knowledge acquisition ends in reality (Codoban, 1996). Thus, humans take hold of the reality that is unveiled through knowledge and benefit from the comfort it grants. Employing analytical intelligence as a means to acquire comfort could be the cause of the slight decrease in Western IQ average which is mentioned by Ellis et al. (2013). That is, the reverse evolution trend of IQ average (from an increase to a decrease) for the past years, especially in industrialized countries, could be the consequence of a comfortable standard of living.

In this respect, reaching the level of maximum influence of environmental factors combined with an increase in the influence of genetic factors does not lead to the decrease in the IQ average. The latter could be caused by the transformation of artificial intelligence in an unemployed tool that, as a result of that, loses its performance. If the need for comfort has already been met, if, in addition, any new need comes along with the solution to meeting it, then Westerners are not left with too much usage for their analytical intelligence. In such a context, its diminishing is the result of its previous over-use. The foreseen decrease in the IQ average does not necessarily mean a decrease in Westerners’ overall intelligence. On the contrary, it can be balanced by the positive evolution of other types of intelligence. In this context, the West, which ever since the

beginning of modern times has unilaterally developed its operational rationality, could revalue its significant rationality. A functionalist view purports that once the need for exterior comfort is met, the tool used for that is stored away and then the instrument for meeting the need for interior comfort is employed. Thus, analytical intelligence makes room for emotional and creative intelligence. And the latter are no longer negatively correlated with religiosity.

The concept of religiosity as operationalized by Zuckerman et al. (2013) is pretty rigid. They rely on the definition provided by Atran and Norenzayan (2004), and view religiosity as involvement in some or all the facets of religion, among which they explicitly mention: “beliefs in supernatural agents, costly commitment to these agents (e.g., offering of property), using beliefs in those agents to lower existential anxieties such as anxiety over death, and communal rituals that validate and affirm religious beliefs” (Zuckerman et al., 2013). Even the meaning of religiosity used by Ellis et al. is rigid and close to the canonical one, as the items they use to measure religiosity suggest: “Belief in god (supreme-being)/ Belief in immortality (life afterdeath)/ Importance of religion to your daily life/ Religious fundamentalism/ Obey the teachings of a specific religion/ Active in religious observances/ Religious strictness of parents while growing up” (p. 6).

As Hamberg (2011) indicates, the term of “religiosity” has a wider array of meanings than those assigned by Christianity. It subsumes the religious experiences from both within and outside the Church. The various forms of spirituality, the archaic and pre-Christian religions that were revitalized with the birth of secularization are facets of contemporary Western religiosity. They are based on an individualistic approach to faith, on an individual and voluntary acceptance of the believer status that is triggered by an evaluation process. Consequently, they are no longer in a negative correlation with intelligence.

Thus, the premise of a negative correlation between intelligence and religiosity as presented by Ellis et al (2017) has its nuances. It can be admitted as true in the case of the correlation between the analytical intelligence and the religiosity from within the dominant Church. Nonetheless, it raises doubts for the other meanings of the terms: emotional and/or creative intelligence in correlation with the religiosity from within the Church, analytical intelligence correlated with the religiosity outside the Church, emotional and/or creative intelligence in correlation with the religiosity outside the Church.

The doubts raised by one premise also influence the validity of conclusions in a comforting manner. Nonetheless, that does not necessarily mean that the counter-secularization hypothesis is necessarily false. The inference related to the decrease in intelligence and the hijacking of the secularization process remains valid for the analytical intelligence and the rigid, canonical religiosity from within the Church. But that is only one of the possible alternatives. Taking a nuanced approach to the premise concerning the negative correlation between intelligence and religiosity, and the possibility to semantically redefine secularization as the decline of any type of religiosity or, more explicitly, of the Christian religiosity (Hamberg, 2011) significantly complicates the decision on the validity of conclusions. The propositional expressions of the reasoning leading to these conclusions and which allow expressing the nuances of the premise are, under these circumstances, accomplishable functions.

Nonetheless, the diversion of the secularization process is also signalled by Dobbeleare (2011) Lambert (2003), Hamberg (2011).

Based on the same logic that purports a compensating equilibrium between operational rationality and significant rationality, the religious (over) saturation of Muslims could trigger a future secular stage in the case of Islam, as well. A favouring factor in this respect is their long-term contact with the Western cultural environment, despite signals that indicate an increase in the religiosity (even fundamentalism) of the second generation of Muslims established in Europe (Netherlands) mentioned by Ellis et al. (2017). The increase in the religiosity of the young Muslims could only be a transitional reaction linked to their adaptation to a secularized environment. Western media redundantly warns against the isolationist tendencies of conservative Muslim communities in European cities and on their reluctance to accept the cultural implications of the West's secularization. However, the appetite for a secular thinking supported by the development of analytical intelligence might push the barriers programmatically imposed by the spiritual leaders of the Muslim from the West given the deeply rooted need of humans in general to balance how their mind works.

5. A More Generous Counter-Secularization Hypothesis

Emotional and creative intelligence favour a holistic approach to humans' relation to the world. Such a standing is a common topoi in the Oriental mystic approaches and is retrieved by Western physics during the last century (Capra, 1995). This type of understanding is shaped by quantum physics as non-local causality, uncertainty relations, temporal reversibility, probability field, etc.

The mutation that occurred in physics concerning the representation of reality will eventually defeat the inertia of common knowledge. The analytical intelligence that governs this type of knowledge will have to recalibrate and, as a result of that, its compatibility with the holistic approach to the world will increase. Implicitly, overall intelligence (including its emotional and creative dimensions that are already compatible with the holistic approach) will no longer be part of a negative correlation with religiosity. Thus, the very meaning of religiosity becomes broader and more generous.

Thus, the back stroke of secularization must not necessarily be viewed as a source of embarrassment or discomfort for the Europeans. It can only be the result of a change in perspective imposed by physics, namely by exactly the science upheld by the neo-positivists as the most adequate discipline for practicing analytical intelligence. This change sabotages possible expectations concerning the negative correlation between intelligence and religiosity and generously unveils a new humanistic perspective on the spiritual future of the West which can belong both to the intelligent and the religious.

The paradigm of the new physics already accepted and manifest in various theoretical approaches to different fields of knowledge (Capra, 2004) gradually imposes on common knowledge. That fuels religiosity and facilitates the positive correlation between religiosity and intelligence. This hypothesis converges with the ecumenical orientation that accompanies the process of globalization at religious level. However, the convergence is limited by the phenomenon of the privatization of faiths.

The reductionist transformation of Christianity into charity, mentioned by Rorty și Vattimo (2008), is part of this new perspective. Transformation can be viewed as

accomplishing the very goal of Christianity (in which case the latter's kenotic religious significance is retrieved) and/or natural closure of a cycle in the morphology of culture. In both cases, the secular orientation of Christianity to charity can be integrated as a stage in the evolution of complex, (all) encompassing religiosity.

6. Conclusion

The secularization of the West from the perspective of the loss of social power by religion (Dobbeleare, 2011) cannot be denied. However, secularization defined by Dobbeleare as the diminishing of piety at individual level is another matter. Recent research on religiosity have highlighted that simultaneously with the narrowing of canonical religiosity characteristic of dominant religion(s), alternate types of religiosity develop. They are either resurrections of some pre-Christian, pagan cults, or spiritual non-constraining borrowings (especially from the East that has a generous offer in this respect for the cultivated Westerner) that are compatible with secularization as defined by Dobbeleare (2011). At the same time, these alternate manifestations of religiosity increases individuals' piety in the context of faith privatization.

The post-secular age in which the West enters does not necessarily mean a reduction in the religiosity of the Westerners, nor its increase as a result of the role genetic factors play in diminishing the IQ average. On the contrary, such an age, spiritually speaking, can be a generous one for the West. It can lead to a re-correlation of intelligence and religiosity (after the interlude of modernity) while the paradigm proposed by contemporary physics also changes.

Hence, the perspective is not necessarily dim.

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